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1	  Foresight	  programmes	  and	  other	  approaches	  to	  future-­‐oriented	  analyses	  
Decision-makers, experts and laymen in different historical periods and in different socio-
economic systems shared at least one desire: to know their future in advance or even to 
influence it for their advantage. They used very different approaches and methods from 
spiritual/ religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning.1 Without 
going into details here, it is worth recalling some of the major methods/ approaches in order 
to locate – and distinguish – foresight programmes: 
• visionary thinking (in ancient times by prophets, more recently mainly by consultants) 
• forecasting (at different levels, using different methods, e.g. trend analysis, 
extrapolation) 
• futures studies (for academic purposes) 
• prospective analyses (for business or policy purposes, e.g. [technology] roadmapping, 
list of critical/ strategic/ key technologies) 
• strategy formation (at firm, sectoral, regional or national levels) 
• scenario planning (at a firm level; see e.g. Godet, 2001) 
• indicative national planning 
• central planning (at a national level) 
• foresight programmes.2 
Obviously, the above approaches have a number of common characteristics. All of them (a) 
deal with the future(s) in one way or another; (b) collect and analyse various pieces of 
information, and (c) can apply a wide range of methods, mainly scientific ones. Three key 
features can be used to differentiate the above approaches, and thus distinguish foresight 
programmes from other methods. These approaches can: 
• be action-oriented vs. ‘contemplative’ (passive) 
• be participatory vs. non-participatory 
• consider alternative futures vs. a single future state (already ‘set’ by external forces). 
Action-oriented endeavours aim at shaping/ influencing/ acting upon the future,3 while 
passive ones are ‘contemplating’ about it (e.g. ‘pure’ futurologist studies, without any policy 
                                                
1 Hence, a special chapter of the history of mankind can be devoted to these different attitudes, methods and 
approaches towards the future. 
2 The term ‘foresight programme(s)’ is used throughout this paper as an attempt to distinguish individual 
(personal) foresight and ‘collective’ foresight programmes, i.e. the ones launched (and sponsored) by an 
organisation (or several ones), and conducted by a number participants. Moreover, an increasing number of 
articles published by researchers working in the field of future studies, in which ‘foresight’ is used as a new label 
for their work (although still following the ‘futures studies’ or futurology paradigm), see e.g. the recent issues of 
Futures, especially Vol. 36, No. 2. It does not seem to be a productive, promising dispute trying to establish the 
‘real’ meaning of foresight, and then attempting to ‘enforce’ it across various communities of practice. 
3 E.g. the slogan of the first UK Foresight Programme was: “Shaping our future”. 
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implications. In other words, the latter ones merely try to develop a better-informed 
anticipation of the future, e.g. for being better prepared by having more precise information. 
Participatory future-oriented programmes/ projects meet all the three following criteria: they 
(i) involve participants from at least two different stakeholder groups (e.g. researchers and 
business people; experts and policy-makers; experts and laymen); (ii) disseminate their 
preliminary results (e.g. analyses, tentative conclusions and policy proposals) among 
interested ‘non-participants’,4 e.g. face-to-face at workshops, electronically via the internet 
with free access for everyone, or in the form of printed documents, leaflets, newsletters; and 
(iii) seek feedback from this wider circle (again, either face-to-face or in a written form). 
Conversely, if any of these criteria is not met, that activity cannot be regarded a participatory 
programme or project. 
Finally, certain approaches are based on the assumption that the future is not pre-determined 
yet; and thus the future can evolve in different directions, to some extent depending on the 
actions of various players and decisions taken ‘today’. In other words, there is a certain 
degree of freedom in choosing among the alternative, feasible futures, and hence increasing 
the chance of arriving at the preferred (selected) future state. Clearly, there is a close link 
between being action-oriented and considering alternative futures.5 Other approaches, on the 
contrary, can only think of a single future, already ‘fixed’ by certain factors, and thus the task 
is to explore (forecast, predict) ‘the’ future scientifically.6 
In sum, foresight programmes are action-oriented, participatory and consider alternative 
futures. 
 
 
2	  Focus	  of	  foresight	  programmes	  
Foresight programmes may have rather dissimilar foci, ranging from the identification of 
priorities in a strict S&T context to addressing broad societal/ socio-economic challenges. 
Georghiou (2001) and (2002) identified three generations of prospective/ strategic 
technological analyses. This classification is used here as point of departure to develop a 
typology of foresight programmes to analyse their potential and actual role in policy-making. 
The first generation is the classical technological forecasting, aimed at predicting 
technological developments, based on extrapolation of perceptible trends.7 
The main aim of a second-generation foresight programme is to improve competitiveness by 
strengthening academy-industry co-operation, correcting the so-called market failure8 and 
trying to extend the usually too short time horizon of businesses.9 
                                                
4 ‘Non-participants’ are those persons who have not been members of panels or working groups set up by the 
programme, and have not been involved directly in any other way, e.g. by answering (Delphi) questionnaires. 
5 Some foresight programmes, e.g. the second Swedish Technology Foresight Programme, consider alternative 
futures with the explicit aim of identifying key choices confronting their ‘constituency’ or ‘target audience’, but 
do not intend to single out any preferred future. In other words, these programmes do not follow a normative 
approach. (This approach, and the example, has been mentioned by Göran Pagels-Fick among his comments on 
an earlier draft.) 
6 Cuhls (2003) offers an excellent, comprehensive discussion on the differences between forecasting, prediction, 
planning and foresight. The possibility of a single future vs. “many” futures is a central element of her analysis. 
7 These predictions are produced by a relatively small group of experts: futurologists and/or technological 
experts (that is, other types of expertise or actors are not sought after in the process of forecasting): The main 
objective is to predict which S&T areas are likely to produce exploitable results. Forecast results, in turn, are 
used in economic planning, either at firm or macro level. 
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A third-generation foresight programme tackles broad/er/ socio-economic challenges, and 
hence besides researchers and business people government officials and social stakeholders 
are also involved. 
Three ‘ideal types’ of foresight programmes can be defined as major ‘reference points’. 
Identifying ‘ideal types’ is a long-established practice in social sciences (and somewhat 
similar to ‘models’ used in all fields of sciences): “The fact that none of these three ideal 
types (…) is usually to be found in historical cases in ‘pure’ form, is naturally not a valid 
objection to attempting their conceptual formulation is the sharpest possible form.”10 (Weber, 
1947, reprinted in Pugh, 1988, p. 16) 
Note, however, that all three ideal types of foresight programmes should meet the criteria 
defined above in Section 1: they should be action-oriented, participatory and should consider 
alternative futures. The underlying difference among them is their focus: 
• S&T issues: type A foresight programmes 
• techno-economic issues: type B foresight programmes 
• broad societal/ socio-economic issues: type C foresight programmes.11 
Their further characteristics, in terms of their aims, rationales and participants, are 
summarised in Table 1. One would notice immediately that these ideal types are not 
distinguished by their themes (topics): for example, they all deal with S&T issues, but by 
doing so, they pursue different aims, and follow different (policy) rationales. In other words, 
they address different challenges, ask different questions, use different approaches/ ways of 
thinking,12 and involve different participants. In other words, these ideal types should not be 
thought of as “Russian dolls”: the biggest one, type C incorporating the middle one, i.e. type 
B, and, in turn, type B encompassing the smallest one (the ‘core’), Type A. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
8 In short, private returns on R&D are smaller than social returns (as firms cannot appropriate all the profits 
stemming form R&D), and thus firms do not invest into R&D at a sufficient – socially optimal – level. 
9 Accordingly, a different set of actors is involved in these programmes: researchers working on various S&T 
fields and business people, bringing knowledge on markets into the process. These programmes are organised by 
following the structure of economic sectors (various industries and services). 
10 It is just a coincidence that Weber also talks of three ideal types when discussing legitimate authority. 
11 In short, the most important modification compared to the three generations identified by Georghiou is to 
replace technology forecasting with foresight programmes focussing on S&T issues. Technology forecasting 
projects usually do not consider alternative futures, and most of them are not participatory either (as defined in 
Section 1). However, there is no reason to assume that S&T issues cannot be tackled in a participatory manner, 
considering alternative futures, and aiming at informing and influencing present actions. For example, the recent 
Turkish Foresight Programme – the Vision 2023 Project – has focussed on S&T issues. (Tümer, 2004) 
12  See e.g. Havas (2005) for more details on the differences in terms of questions, approaches – when analysing 
the same theme (technological field). 
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Table 1: Foci of foresight programmes 
 S&T focus (type A) Techno-economic 
focus (type B) 
Societal/ socio-economic 
focus (type C) 
Aims Identify S&T priorities 
(following the logic of 
scientific discovery) 
Identify research topics in 
S&T, of which results are 
believed to be useful for 
businesses 
Identify research topics in 
S&T, of which results are 
believed to contribute to 
addressing major societal/ 
socio-economic challenges 
Devise other policies – or 
identify policy domains, 
which are relevant – to 
tackle these societal/ socio-
economic issues 
Rationale Boost national prestige, 
achieve S&T excellence; 
Following the linear 
model of innovation, 
socio-economic benefits 
might also be assumed; 
implicitly or explicitly 
Business logic: improve 
competitiveness 
Correct market failures: 
strengthen academia-
industry co-operation, 
extend the short time 
horizon of businesses 
Improve quality of life 
(enhance competitiveness 
as a means for that) 
Correct systemic failures, 
strengthen the National 
Innovation System 
Participants Researchers, policy-
makers (e.g. S&T and 
finance ministries) 
Researchers, business 
people, policy-makers 
Researchers, business 
people, policy-makers, 
social stakeholders (lay 
persons?) 
Potential users usually constitute a broader group than the actual participants; they might 
include e.g. funding organisations, other policy implementation bodies and public service 
providers (including ‘quangos’ [quasi-NGOs]), professional associations representing the 
interests of their members (and thus involving them to some extent in strategy and policy 
formation processes in various ways), venture capitalists, trade unions, etc. Depending on the 
focus of a foresight programme (the types of challenges/ issues considered), as well as the 
political culture of a given country or region, some of these potential users and stakeholders 
might become participants, too. In any case, it is not possible to establish a one-to-one 
relationship between an ‘ideal type’ of foresight and its participants beyond the ‘typical’ 
participants indicated in Table 1. The type and number of participants, the methods, channels 
and for a used their ‘internal’ and ‘external’ dialogues,13 as well as the intensity, quality and 
impacts of these dialogues is obviously a question for the individual description, analysis or 
evaluation of actual foresight programmes. 
Types A and B programmes have a longer tradition, and thus in general they are better 
known. Obvious examples are the Turkish Vision 2023 Project (type A) and the first UK 
Foresight Programme (Type B). (Tümer, 2004, and Georghiou, 1996, respectively) 
Therefore, only type C programmes are explained here in some detail. The shift in focus is 
reflected in the structure, too: these programmes are organised along major societal/ socio-
economic concerns (e.g. health, ageing population, crime prevention in the case of the 
                                                
13 Internal dialogues take place among the participants of a given programme, e.g. among panel members, 
between panels, between panels and the management team, between the steering group and panels – or any other 
internal groups of participants in case these ones have not existed. External dialogues are organised among the 
participants and other stakeholders, clients, target groups, etc., i.e. those, who have not participated in the 
programme in a direct way. 
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Hungarian, the first Swedish or the second UK foresight programmes; see Boxes 1-2 in 
Section 4.3). A new element in the underlying rationale can also be discerned, the so-called 
systemic failure argument: the existing institutions (written and tacit codes of behaviour, rules 
and norms) and organisations are not sufficient to improve quality of life and enhance 
competitiveness, and thus new institutions should be ‘designed’ by intense communication 
and co-operation among the participants. In other words, the existing gaps should be bridged 
by new networks, appropriate policies aimed at correcting systemic failures, and establishing 
or strengthening relevant organisations. A foresight programme, based on this rationale, can 
deliver solutions in various forms: by strengthened, re-aligned networks as ‘process’ results of 
the programme, as well as by policy recommendations (‘products’). 
An actual foresight programme is likely to combine certain elements from various types. In 
most cases, however, one type of rationale would be chosen as a principal one; it thus would 
underlie the more detailed objectives and structure of a programme, as well as the choice of 
its participants. Otherwise, it would likely to lead to an incoherent – even chaotic – exercise, 
characterised by tensions between (a) the various objectives, (b) elements of its structure, (c) 
the objectives and methods, (d) the participants and objectives, and/or (e) among the 
participants themselves. A certain level of tension, however, might be quite useful – or even 
essential – to produce creative, innovative ideas and solutions, of course, but too intense and 
too frequently occurring – structural, inherent – conflicts would most likely tear a foresight 
programme apart. 
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